	
  

Globalization Checkmated?
Political and Geopolitical Contradictions
Coming Home to Roost

Thomas I. Palley

July 2018

WORKINGPAPER SERIES
	
  

Number 466

POLITICAL ECONOMY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE

	
  

Globalization Checkmated? Political and Geopolitical Contradictions Coming
Home to Roost1
Abstract
The deepening of economic globalization appears to have ground to a halt and the
process may even unravel a little. The sudden stop has surprised economists, whose
belief in globalization has strong parallels with Fukuyama’s (1989) flawed end of history
hypothesis. The paper presents a simple analytic model that shows how economic
globalization has triggered political and geopolitical contradictions. For the system to
work, politics within countries and geopolitics across blocs must be supportive of the
system. That is missing. The model is applied to a global economic core consisting of the
US, China, and the European Union. It is revealing of multiple tensions, fracture lines,
and contradictions. Within the US, globalization has delivered economic outcomes that
have estranged the electoral bases of both major political parties. It has also delivered
outcomes that are inconsistent with the US neocon geopolitical inclination. President
Trump is a product of those forces, and he will likely prove to be a historically significant
figure. That is because he has surfaced geopolitical contradictions that cannot be swept
back under the rug. Ironically, his biggest impact may be on the European Union,
particularly Germany, which is being compelled to recognize the neocon nature of the US
and the vulnerabilities of dependence on US exports and technology. China was already
aware of its vulnerabilities in those regards.
Keywords: Globalization, barge economics, geopolitical contradictions, national political
tensions.
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Washington, DC
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1. Economic failings and the rise of politics
It has been ten years since the financial crisis. Since then, the global economy has
recovered and attention has increasingly shifted to political risks as the trigger for the
next economic crisis. That shift of attention has been driven by political events like the
UK’s Brexit referendum, the election of President Trump, and the rise of anti-euro
populist political parties in Italy. Such events have the potential to cause financial
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disruptions that trigger broader economic dislocation, which in turn could further
aggravate political conditions. In effect, we have moved to a world in which politics has
become an important potential economic detonator.
The rise of politics is no accident. Instead, it reflects the popularly perceived
failings of the neoliberal economic paradigm which has dominated economic
policymaking for the past forty years. Since globalization is the most prominent feature
of the neoliberal program and has also had some of the most visible negative effects, it
has been placed in the forefront of the backlash. That backlash suggests globalization is
unlikely to deepen further, and may even unravel a bit.
2. Globalization as economists’ version of the “end of history” fallacy
The challenge to globalization has taken economists by surprise. In many ways, there are
parallels between economists’ faith in globalization and Francis Fukuyama’s (1989) “end
of history” hypothesis. After the demise of the Soviet Union, Fukuyama prophesied that
free market liberal democracy had become the “final form of human government, to
which all countries would now converge (Fukuyama, 1989, 3)”.
Fukuyama’s hypothesis reflected the triumphalism that accompanied the fall of
the Soviet Union. Within ten years it was already looking frayed, and within twenty years
it was in tatters. At its base, lies a flawed understanding of human psychology regarding
the appeal of identity, religion, racism, tribalism, and nationalism. Those profound forces
easily lend themselves to majoritarian democracy without minority rights, or even
outright authoritarianism. The fallacy of the end of history hypothesis was already visible
at its inception in the form of rising Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and
robust Christian fundamentalism in the USA. The discontent with the neoliberal
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experiment has further encouraged non-liberal forces, as evidenced by the tilt toward
nationalist illiberal democracy in Russia and Central and Eastern Europe. In China, a
hybrid state – free market economic system has emerged in which the political system is
nationalist and authoritarian and moving in the direction of a high-tech totalitarian
surveillance state.
Strong parallels can be drawn between mainstream economists’ belief in
neoliberal globalization and Fukuyama’s end of history hypothesis. Economists’ thinking
rests on the ideal of competitive general equilibrium which frames modern economic
theory. That theory justifies the neoliberal economic paradigm, and trade theory extends
the paradigm into the international sphere via application of the principle of comparative
advantage which supposedly determines the pattern of specialization and trade.
Given this framework, globalization is presented as inevitable and unstoppable
owing to the forces of technology and mutually beneficial gains from trade. The optimal
future course of the global economy is to follow the template established by the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Any who question that analytical perspective and its policy
prescriptions are labelled as protectionists, luddites, or economic nationalists, and they
are written off as being on the wrong side of economic history.
Unfortunately, as with Fukuyama’s political version of the end of history, events
now threaten economists’ economic version of the end of history. That is because
neoliberal globalization has run smack into a host of economic, political, and geopolitical
contradictions.
3. Surfacing the economic, political, and geopolitical contradictions of globalization
The nature of those contradictions can be understood with the help of the analytical
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model shown in Figure 1. At the center is the process and nexus of arrangements that
constitute economic globalization. Economic globalization links blocs and reorders
economic arrangements, generating changed economic outcomes and possibilities in
them. Within each bloc, those changed outcomes and possibilities have political and
geopolitical ramifications.2
Figure 1. The economic, political, and geo-political structure of economic globalization.
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Mainstream economic analysis of globalization fails on two counts. First, it
misconstrues the fundamental economics. Second, it neglects the political and
geopolitical feedbacks, which vary by bloc and challenge the future of globalization.
Those failings explain economists failure to anticipate why globalization now appears to
be checkmated.
Every model constitutes a simplification. Figure 1 shows globalization in terms of three blocs – the USA,
China, and the European Union. Those blocs constitute the lion’s share of the global economy. Other
OECD, emerging market, and developing countries are excluded for simplicity. However, they too can
potentially be analyzed using the same framework.
2
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3.a The economics of globalization
As regards economics, the conventional wisdom interprets globalization through the lens
of trade theory, which maintains there are gains for all countries that participate.3 The
narrative is that there have been two globalizations in the modern era. The first began
around 1870 and ended in 1914. The second began in 1945 and is still underway.
Globalization is identified with the history of trade, and the narrative is constructed
around a temporary inter-war interruption that put globalization on hold in the 1920s and
1930s.
In a recent paper (Palley, 2018), I have challenged the conventional view and
argued that there have been three globalizations, not two. The first Victorian globalization
ran from 1870 to 1914. The second Keynesian era globalization ran from 1945 to 1990.
Both were driven by gains from trade that provided aggregate benefits to countries and
the world economy.
Since 1990 there has been a third neoliberal globalization which has been driven
by industrial reorganization, motivated by redistributing income to capital away from
labor. Neoliberal globalization can be described as “barge economics” (Palley, 2007,
2008). The idea draws on the observation by Jack Welch, former CEO of General
Electric, that business would ideally like to have “every plant you own on a barge”.
Welch envisioned factories floating between countries to take advantage of lowest costs,
be they due to under-valued exchange rates, low taxes, subsidies, absence of regulation,
or abundant cheap exploitable labor. In such a world, there is an inevitable large increase
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Proponents of globalization make claims of large gains from trade. Those gains are outlandish in terms of
their own theory, which is already based on the optimistic assumption of full employment (Rodrik, 2007).
They effectively exclude the possibility of losses contemplated by other theoretical perspectives (Capaldo,
2014).
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in trade because goods must cross borders, but trade theory does not explain what is
going on.
Barge economics produces winners and losers. In developed economies, capital’s
share has increased at the expense of labor’s as workers and the entire economic system
are subject to pressures from global labor, regulatory, tax, and social wage arbitrage.
Developing countries can gain from arrival of the barge to the extent it brings FDI and
technology, and promotes domestic investment and export-led growth. That has been the
case in China. But developing countries can also lose to the extent that their indigenous
industrial base and income distribution is subjected to barge arbitrage, or to the extent
that the barge only brings shallow export-processing zone development. That has been
the case with Mexico.
Barge economics is motivated by distributional conflict. Since investments and
expenses incurred for redistribution are costly to the economy, it undermines claims of a
market economy to be Pareto optimal. Barge economics means there may even be no net
gains from trade, and society may be worse off. Profits increase so that capital gains and
labor loses, but labor’s losses can exceed capital’s gains. That is fundamentally different
from conventional Stolper – Samuelson (1941) income redistribution effects which are
generated in the context of Heckscher-Ohlin trade that increases global productivity.
In addition to misconstruing the economics of the neoliberal third globalization,
economists neglect the domestic political and geopolitical ramifications. Those
ramifications vary by bloc, and they raise conflicts and contradictions that threaten to
check globalization. The domestic political checks operate within blocs, while the
geopolitical checks operate between blocs. It is those checks that now challenge
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globalization.
3.b The US: economics, politics, and geopolitics
In the US, neoliberal globalization has caused massive manufacturing job and wage
losses (Bronfenbrenner, 2000; Bronfenbrenner and Luce, 2004; Autor et al., 2013; Scott,
2017), and the economic damage has been significant. The manufacturing jobs which
have been lost have historically been “good” jobs, paying higher wages and benefits and
having large multiplier effects. They have also tended to be concentrated by community
and region, which concentrates the deleterious economic impact.4
The US trade deficit has been a major channel through which manufacturing jobs
have been lost, as it has substituted imported foreign production for domestic production.
The trade deficit has also mattered because it is a leakage of demand so that it has
aggravated recessions caused by demand shortage, and also weakened economic
recoveries.5
Another important channel of manufacturing job loss has been investment
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Some economists try and dismiss globalization job losses as insignificant on grounds that they are small
compared to the US economy’s annual job creation and destruction. That reasoning is faulty. Think of an
economy with two sectors. Sector 1 jobs are stable and have little turnover. Sector 2 jobs are volatile and
open and close each month (e.g. seasonal tourism and retail, or restaurants). Over the year, the cumulative
job churn in sector 2 will be huge and will dwarf the total number of jobs in sector 1. But wiping out the
stable jobs in sector 1 will do great economic harm and also disadvantage the significant number of
workers in sector 1.
5
The trade deficit has been a major channel of deindustrialization. This channel is easily understood by the
general public, which has therefore made the deficit a catch-all symbol for the negative effects of
globalization. Of course, other macroeconomic factors are also involved in determining the deficit, and
economist advocates of neoliberal globalization try to belittle the public for not getting this. The public are
not economists, and they are also right about the trade deficit’s deleterious economic effects. If anything, it
is the economists who have misunderstood the deficit (Palley, 2012, Chapter 7). In the 1980s, economists
invented the “twin deficits” hypothesis that blamed the trade deficit on the budget deficit. That hypothesis
collapsed in the 1990s when the budget moved to surplus but the trade deficit kept growing. After that,
economists invented the “saving shortage” hypothesis which blamed the deficit on lack of household
saving. That hypothesis collapsed in the 2000s when the trade deficit continued even as the economy
suffered from demand shortage. There is a macroeconomic linkage between the trade deficit, the budget
deficit, and household saving, making them cousins (Blecker, 2013). However, structural factors (e.g.
globalization) and an over-valued dollar exchange rate have been the decisive factors (Palley, 2015). In
sum, the general public has been more right than economists.
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diversion. Investment that would previously have taken place within the US has been
diverted outside, thereby shortchanging US job growth.
The combination of loss of both existing and new manufacturing jobs has then
had static and dynamic negative effects. The static effects reflect the immediate negative
effects. The dynamic effects concern the negative impact on growth. Manufacturing is a
leading engine of productivity growth (Palley, 1999), and its decline helps explain the
failure of US productivity growth to recover the rates of the 1990s.
Lastly, manufacturing job loss has also had severe socio-political impacts. As
noted above, manufacturing tends to be concentrated by community and region, which
concentrates and amplifies the deleterious social consequences of job loss. Second, union
membership was concentrated in manufacturing for historical reasons. Manufacturing job
loss has therefore hammered union membership, which has generated serious knock-on
labor market and political effects. The reduction of the unionization threat effect in labor
markets has diminished wages in non-union jobs. The diminished size and power of
unions has meant diminished union political influence, so that workers have had less
political representation at a time when corporate political power has increased.6
As regards US politics, the adverse economic effects have triggered a growing
popular backlash in the US against globalization. The backlash split the Democratic
Party, with the establishment elite siding with globalization and also winning out. The
failure of the Democratic party to remedy the issue meant the issue was thrown into open
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Some glibly say unions should just organize workers in new expanding sectors and globalization is not
the issue. However, the new workplaces are highly dispersed, have fewer workers per worksite, and are
difficult and costly to organize. Moreover, the increased political power of corporations has created a legal
environment that facilitates worker intimidation by firms and makes union organizing almost impossible.
Globalization’s adverse impacts have therefore contributed to creating a doom loop whereby globalization
weakens unions and worsens the context, which promotes further union weakness.
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field. That gave the Republican Party, led by Donald Trump, the opportunity to pick it up
and fuse it with racist, anti-immigrant, and xenophobic arguments. This has created a
toxic populist Republican brew that mixes pro-corporate globalization policy with antitrade rhetoric, racist anti-immigration policy, and aggressive nationalism. It has also
confused the debate. Globalization was made in the USA by US corporations for US
corporations, and it has delivered exactly as planned (Palley, 2015). Now, Trump has
redefined it as something foreigners have done to the US.7
Trump’s redefinition saved the Republican Party from its globalization impasse
with the electorate. However, it means both political parties are now split, with
globalization being the fulcrum of their splits. Both parties’ bases are opposed to the
existing neoliberal globalization paradigm, while both parties’ elites are supportive of it.
The open question is whether the political elites can keep political control, either by
explicitly suffocating change or by a subterfuge of promising change that is not delivered
on? If they cannot, globalization will be checked by US national politics.
As regards US geopolitics, globalization triggers different fissures. With regard to
politics, the establishment political elite is unified and divided from the base. With regard
to geopolitics, the country is unified but the political elite is tactically divided.
For the past forty years, the US has become increasingly dominated by the neocon
construction of geopolitics. That construction holds never again shall there be a foreign
power that can rival the US, as happened with the Soviet Union in the Cold War. It can be
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Such a redefinition was always a possibility, and US progressives have strayed perilously close to
encouraging it by framing their opposition to globalization in terms of Chinese “cheating” on exchange
rates, intellectual property, subsidies, non-tariff barriers, and export dumping. Unfortunately, that is a pitfall
which is difficult to avoid as those issues are serious problems in their own right.
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labelled the Cheney – Rumsfeld doctrine.8
Originally, the neocon view represented ultra-conservative Republican thinking,
but it has substantially become mainstream thinking. Both Republicans and many
Democrats now believe the US has the right to intervene unilaterally anywhere in the
world, any time it chooses. Those bipartisan forces also believe the U.S. has the right to
pepper the globe with military bases and military personnel deployments. Democrats tend
to be softer than Republicans on the issue of unrivalled power, but they compensate by
supplementing the neocon rationale for global intervention with the claim that the United
States has a right to intervene in the name of protecting and advancing democracy. That
right derives from “U.S. exceptionalism”, whereby the U.S. has a special mission to
transform the world by promoting democracy.
The political bases of both parties are also largely supportive of this neocon
construction of geopolitics. The average US citizen is intoxicated by nationalist pride in
the military and supportive of the massive military budget even though it means
foregoing other publicly provided goods. There has been no meaningful opposition to the
state of permanent war, and the tolerance for war is high because the US is significantly
insulated from its human cost owing to the absence of a draft, the disengaged nature of
aerial and drone warfare, and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans which prevent the
backwash of war reaching US shores. As long as these insulating barriers hide the human
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The neocon view does not come out of the blue of US history. The US has always been an expansionist
state, and its expansion has been paired with the doctrine of “US exceptionalism” which provides a moral
justification. In the 19th century, expansion was directed to colonizing the western frontier, which included
conquering a large chunk of Mexico. At the end of the 19th century, the US made the leap to having
overseas colonies. The cooked-up 1898 Spanish – American War was decisive, and represented the triumph
of imperialism within the US polity (Kinzer, 2017). For fifty years, World War II and the Cold War
obscured that imperialist DNA by providing the US with the cover of being a benevolent non-imperialist
hegemon. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union stripped away that cover,
revealing neo-conservatism which is the latest evolution of US expansionism.
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costs of war cost and the electorate remains blind to the opportunity cost of resources
showered on the military, the US electorate is likely to remain largely supportive of the
neocon vision.
Whereas the political elite and the general public are united in their
neoconservative geopolitical outlook, there is a fundamental tension between
neoconservative geopolitics and globalization. Additionally, there are tensions within the
US elite regarding geopolitical tactics. These twin tensions mean globalization also faces
checks owing to US geopolitical concerns.
The fundamental tension between neo-conservatism and globalization is evident
in the rise of China, which has benefitted from globalization. Globalization has
diminished the US industrial base, hugely strengthened China’s industrial base, and it has
also given China a strategic choke-hold over the global supply chain. Those
developments have strengthened China’s military and economic power, thereby implicitly
diminishing US power since power is relative (Palley, 2013).
As regards the geopolitical tactical tension, the Republican elite is more
nationalistic and militaristic. The Democratic elite has a more cosmopolitan view,
preferring that foreign country elites be drawn into the US globalization project, albeit as
junior partners. Both elites support over-whelming US military superiority, as reflected in
bi-partisan support for the military budget and overseas military engagements.
These elite geopolitical tactical differences explain the differences in Democrats’
and Republicans’ political positioning. Democrats’ cosmopolitan neo-conservatism seeks
to enlist foreign elites as junior partners, the goal being to permanently handcuff allies
and isolate rival powers (especially China). That strategy was epitomized by President
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Obama’s Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was supported by the elites of both
political parties but was hated by the political bases of both parties.9 Republicans’
nationalistic neo-conservatism seeks to engage in circus-style globalization renegotiations
that actually deepen features corporations want - like expanded global intellectual
property rights and protections. Electorally, Republicans’ tactical subterfuge has been
more successful, but the risk is their rhetoric deepens public hostility to globalization and
further destabilizes the establishment elite’s grip on national politics.
In sum, the US elite wants to push ahead with both its neoliberal globalization and
neocon projects, neither of which can be sacrificed. However, consistency between the
neocon and globalization projects requires recalibrating neoliberal globalization. That
recalibration has been blocked by the public’s resentment against globalization. To square
the circle, the establishment elite hopes it can still smuggle through a recalibration of
globalization against the public’s will, but that is looking less and less likely.10
3.c China: economics, politics, and geopolitics
China is the second component of the framework in Figure 1.China is an authoritarian
single party state, which makes it difficult to say much about China’s domestic politics.
Instead, globalization can be assessed in terms of China’s economic development project

This view of Democrats is different from Faux’s (2006) global class war hypothesis. Faux emphasizes the
“Party of Davos” which enables capitalists to escape their national identities and form a global class that
wages class war everywhere. Neo-conservatism is a nationalist philosophy. As such, it inevitably clashes
with the Party of Davos. Democrats are better at concealing that, or simply hoped the attraction of Wall
Street would be sufficient to finesse the contradiction by seducing foreign elites to come on board as junior
partners in the US neocon project. That strategy worked with Mexico’s elite, but not with China and
Russia’s state controlled elites. The verdict is still out on Europe.
10
This can be done by fooling the public into thinking recalibrating globalization is necessary for national
security, so that popular support for the neocon project is enlisted to trump popular resentment with
globalization. Alternatively, the elite can over-ride the public’s will via a bi-partisan Congressional
coalition which is protected from the public’s anger by the entrenched monopolistic two party political
system.
9
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and China’s geopolitical project.
As regards economic development, China has been a big winner from neoliberal
globalization. China has opened itself to FDI, which has resulted in massive inflow of
capital and technology that has been used to make China the premier global export
production platform for multi-national corporations.
However, unlike Mexico, China’s opening has not been passive. Instead, it has
been extremely active. Thus, China has exerted pressure for joint-venture arrangements.
It has also fostered development of its own national corporate champions, and Chinese
capital has been assisted by provision of subsidized capital and widespread unofficially
assisted intellectual property theft. This active industrial policy has been accompanied by
a massive infrastructure build and maintenance of robust capital market controls. The
goal has been to mimic the development of the Asian tigers (South Korea, Taiwan,
Singapore, and Hong Kong) which succeeded in implementing deep development rather
than superficial EPZ development. As a big winner and with its development project
unfinished, China would like to maintain the existing neoliberal globalization status quo.
As regards geopolitics, China’s goal is to establish itself as the regional superpower. That means no other power, including the US, should be able to rival it in its
regional sphere.
Globalization has clearly contributed constructively to China’s geopolitical
project. First, it has generated a massive inflow of technology and enormously increased
China’s industrial base, both of which have contributed to enhancing China’s military
capacity. Second, the China-centric design of globalization has given China a
strategically critical place in the global supply chain, giving it a downward choke-hold
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over regional suppliers and an upward choke-hold over the US (Palley, 2013). Third, the
design of neoliberal globalization has also contributed to diminishing the US industrial
base. As the US is China’s chief geopolitical rival, that has assisted China’s geopolitical
project. Fourth, neoliberal globalization has been structured to produce large trade
surpluses for China and trade deficits for the US (Palley, 2015). That pattern has enabled
China to accumulate huge foreign exchange reserves which provide it with a defensive
shield against US financial power and a “soft power” asset for wooing allies. That too has
assisted China’s geopolitical project.
In sum, both China’s development project and its geopolitical project have
benefitted from the past thirty years of neoliberal globalization. However, in US eyes, the
rules of neoliberal globalization have not been properly enforced against China. If the US
view of those rules and their enforcement were to prevail in the future, the benefits of
neoliberal globalization to China will change significantly. The economic benefits would
be diminished and China will chafe under restrictions it views as being designed by the
US for the benefit of US capital and the US geopolitical project.
China will therefore resist both enforcing the existing rules or changing those
rules in ways aimed at benefitting US workers. Instead, for China, the challenge is to
maintain the status quo which is highly satisfactory.
3.d The European Union: economics, politics, and geopolitics
The European Union (EU) is the third bloc in Figure 1, and the EU’s situation is
significantly different from both the US and China. First, the EU’s macroeconomic
recovery after the 2008 crisis has been extremely weak. That weakness is significantly
due to the consequences of the euro’s poor design (Palley, 2017), combined with
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disastrous embrace of fiscal austerity by European politicians (Truger, 2013).
Second, the last twenty years has seen significant EU expansion via incorporation
of Central European economies, which has constituted a form of EU own miniglobalization. That process has inflicted economic effects on the EU core similar to those
of globalization. The important implication is macroeconomic weakness and
deindustrialization in the EU core have been significantly self-inflicted. Those selfinflicted injuries have been folded into resentments about globalization, creating an even
more politically confused and fraught situation.
Third, the economic impact of globalization has varied by country and region.
Italy and the Mediterranean economies have been losers as their industries competed
most closely with those of China and emerging market economies. Germany has been a
winner, but it was also a trade winner before globalization. It has benefitted from the
globalization success of China and emerging market economies, which has increased
demand for German capital goods and automobiles. Additionally, Germany has also
benefitted from the euro zone’s macro failings which have devalued the euro, thereby
further increasing German export competitiveness.
In sum, the EU is a murky mix of self-inflicted injury, pain from globalization
induced de-industrialization, and gains from globalization induced exports. The important
point is that economic tensions within the EU, and the induced political tensions, are as
least as much due to EU internal policy as to globalization. Both EU expansion and
globalization are elite projects, driven by the EU’s Brussels’ bureaucracy and European
capital. Together, they have undercut popular political support for further expansion of
either project, and the loss of support even threatens the EU itself.
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As regards geopolitics, the EU situation is equally fluid and confused. Put bluntly,
the EU bloc has lacked a geopolitical project. The UK remains atavistically attached to its
imperial past and a misguided belief in a special relationship with the US. France has lost
the confidence and capacity to pursue an independent “de Gaulle” style project. And
Germany remains shy about stepping up to the plate and playing the role befitting the
largest country and strongest economy in Europe. The net result is the EU bloc has
largely played the role of follower to the US, significantly assisting the US geopolitical
projects in the Middle East and versus Russia.
The EU bloc’s geopolitical rudderlessness reflects a combination of incompetence
and continued dominance of old strategic tropes. However, the consequences of the EU
bloc’s rudderless geopolitics are proving disastrous. First, the EU has experienced the
backwash of US Middle Eastern wars in the form of refugees and increased terrorism
risk. The refugee problem in turn interacts with the internal immigration problem created
by EU expansion, so that US geopolitics is now feeding EU disintegration.
Second, siding with the US in its aggressive manufactured conflict with Russia
risks more collateral backwash damage, as well as possibly damaging the European
economy. Third, it is becoming clear that US neocons view Europe as a very junior
partner that can be bossed about. The Trump administration has imposed trade sanctions,
threatens more trade sanctions in the event that the EU does not toe the US line on Iran,
and even more trade sanctions in the event that Germany does not toe the US line on the
Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline with Russia.
Those actions and threats have made the EU, and especially Germany, aware of
the dangers of dependence on exports to the US and dependence on US technology. Such
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dependence makes the German economy vulnerable to US neocon disciplines. It speaks
to strategically diversifying the German economy by reflating the EU and establishing
deeper business connections with Russia, which is a natural economic partner for
Germany.
In sum, the neo-conservative nature of the US speaks to the need for the EU bloc
to recognize the reality of the US geopolitical agenda and develop an independent EU
bloc geopolitical agenda. Meanwhile, the internal political conflicts created by the EU’s
expansion project and by neoliberal globalization speak to the political inability of the
EU to promote further expansion of globalization. Both challenges are a check on
globalization.
4. Globalization checkmated?
Figure 1 shows how globalization is a system of many moving parts. At its center is the
process and arrangements constituting economic globalization. Each country or bloc is
impacted by globalization, giving rise to economic, political, and geopolitical
implications. For the system to work, politics within each bloc and geopolitics across
blocs must be supportive of the system.
Mainstream economists present globalization as the inevitable end of economic
history. They assume globalization is a positive sum economic development for
countries; any adverse country income distribution issues can readily be solved by
transfers; and geopolitical issues are a non-issue. Given that, the system’s parts can be
smoothly synchronized, both within and across blocs so that globalization becomes
irresistible.
The reality is quite different. Barge economics means globalization can be
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negative sum because production relocation is motivated by search for a higher profit
share rather than higher productivity. At the same time, globalization triggers political
and geopolitical contradictions within and between blocs, which can derail or even
reverse the process.
Globalization is an elite project for the benefit of capital in developed countries.
The more that is understood, the deeper will be the popular political opposition in
developed countries.
The clearest geopolitical contradiction is between China and the US. China seeks
to be a regional super-power that none can challenge in its regional sphere of influence.
The US seeks to be a global super-power that none can challenge anywhere. That is a
contradiction, and the US elite cannot support globalization in its current form because it
helps China.
Attempts by the US elite to refashion globalization, in a way that retains the
benefits for capital while reducing China’s economic and geopolitical gains, will face
popular opposition from both the Republican and Democratic base – as illustrated by the
rejection of President Obama’s TPP proposal.
Conversely, progressive reformers have advocated remaking globalization in a
way that includes such measures as enforceable labor and environmental standards,
exchange rate safeguards, and capital controls (see Palley 2012, Chapter 10 for a
description of such a plan). However, a progressive reform program faces opposition
from capital in developed countries. A main purpose of neoliberal globalization has been
to escape such restraints on business which were put in place after the catastrophe of the
Great Depression. Consequently, in the US, progressive reform is stymied by both
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Republican and Democratic Party elites. Furthermore, a progressive reform program will
also be opposed by China and other emerging market economies. They will argue it is an
attempt to enforce inappropriate standards on developing economies, and China will also
see such a program as an infringement of its sovereignty. In sum, globalization appears to
be checkmated, making further deepening unlikely.
Just as deepening appears unlikely, so too reversal will be difficult. First, there are
significant business forces supporting the existing system. Those forces can threaten to
punish governments that seek to change the rules, via such means as moving production
facilities or cutting back on investment. Second, globalization is subject to significant
policy lock-in (Palley, 2017-18) – “Hotel California” effects whereby you can check in
but you cannot check out. Such lock-in has been visible in the euro zone, where countries
have been unable to exit. Similar lock-in is present in the system of globalization. Within
countries, companies have set up international global supply chains that they depend on,
and industries have been shut down on the assumption that companies would be supplied
via imports. Changing those new configurations is costly and disruptive, which is a big
deterrent to change.
Lastly, never say never. Though popular opinion in the US is strongly against
expansion of neoliberal globalization, the political elite may still manage to force through
an expansion. The US elite shares a common project. With regard to economics, the
entire elite is neoliberal, but Republicans are hardcore neoliberals while Democrats are
compassionate neoliberals (Palley, 2012, Chapter 11). With regard to geopolitics, all are
neoconservative, but Republicans are more nationalist while Democrats are more
cosmopolitan.
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The genius of contemporary US politics has been its ability to cast the elite as if it
were profoundly divided and as if that division reflected the full spectrum of policy
options. In fact, it is a form of “Coke versus Pepsi” politics with lots of fizz, but both are
colas. That politics has worked brilliantly for the elite over the last forty years, and it is
still possible the elite could pull off another round of globalization against the popular
will. For instance, elite “Clinton-Obama” Democrats hope there will be a political
reaction against the personality of President Trump which will enable them to smuggle
through a version of their cosmopolitan approach to globalization (i.e. a resuscitated
version of the TPP).11 However, that possibility is increasingly challenged by opposition
of the political base, which already cost Hillary Clinton the presidency in 2016.
5. Postscript: the historical significance of Donald Trump
Lastly, what is the role and historical significance of Donald Trump? President Trump is
an unethical narcissist, but he will likely prove to be a historically significant figure. That
is because his actions have surfaced the geopolitical tensions and contradictions in
neoliberal globalization that others were either keeping quiet about or in denial about. As
a result, those issues can no longer be ignored and nor can they be put back in the bottle.
In particular, Trump has surfaced the neocon character of the US polity, with its
commitment to US global superiority. China has long been aware of that character, but it
suffered it as part of its “long game” approach to development and geopolitics. Trump’s
actions will only have made China more aware of its vulnerabilities from export

11

In the past, that approach would have been carried by the combination of the bulk of the Republican
Party, an element of the Democratic Party, and an elite Democratic President. However, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to accomplish because opposition within the Democratic Party is even larger, while
support in the Republican Party is smaller. Opposition to globalization from both parties’ bases suggests
packaging globalization in different wrapping paper will no longer sell.
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dependence and reliance on imported components and licensed technology.
The really big change concerns the EU, and particularly Germany, which has been forced
to recognize the realities of US neo-conservatism and the dangers of dependence on US
technology and exports to the US.12 Ironically, Trump’s challenge of China (for which
there is much legitimate justification) is likely to have a far bigger and lasting impact on
the EU which has been subjected to an economic and geopolitical wake-up call about the
nature of the US polity.
It is tempting to write Trump off as an ugly idiosyncratic aberration, but that is too
easy and wrong. Some of Trump is ugly, idiosyncratic, and aberrant. However, Trump
was elected by the US electorate and remains very popular with many, which is revealing
of important characteristics of US society. Furthermore, Trump and the Trump
administration are Americans, and their actions are revealing of neocon characteristics
which are shared across party lines, and which are also held by both the elite and the
general public.
Geologists often say they learn most about the earth’s structure from earthquakes
which are extreme events. Trump is a political earthquake and he has provided a learning
moment about the US polity and its geopolitical aspirations. That learning moment is
likely to prove of major historical significance, clearing away lingering delusions of US
benevolence which were created in the mid-20th century. That promises to make Trump a
historically significant figure.

For example, the EU’s Galileo project aims to provide the EU with its own GPS navigation system that
is independent of the US. Projects and policies motivated by desire for independence from the US are likely
to increase significantly in the wake of President Trump.
12
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